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Real and Monetary Disturbances in an Exchange—Rate Union
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates how a small country fares in an exchange—
rate union if that country is subject to real and monetary disturbances
originating at home and abroad. By joining a union, the country can fix
the exchange rate between its currency and the currency of another country
or countries. The paper asks whether or not fixing this exchange rate
helps to modify the effects of disturbances on the domestic economy.
Thisquestion is investigated within a model consisting of an aggre-
gate demand equation dependent upon the terms of trade, an aggregate supply
equationin which labor supply is responsive to the general price level,
and a financial equation that determines the exchange rate of the domestic
currency relative to one of two foreign currencies (the other being determined
by triangular arbitrage). Aggregate supply behavior varies depending upon
whether wages respond to prices with a lag or are indexed to current changes
in the general price level. Because the small country model cannot be
used by itself to analyze the effects of foreign disturbances, the paper
introduces models of two foreign countries with the same analytical structure
as the domestic country model. Foreign disturbances are studied in two
stages, first within the foreign model, then within the domestic model.
The analysis shows that one of the most important factors determining
the effects of the union is the degree of wage indexation in the domestic
economy. The greater the degree of indexation, the less difference there
is between output variation in the union and in a flexible regime. Apart
from wage behavior, two other factors are important: the sources of the
disturbances and the pattern of trade. Contrary to common belief, the
case for a union is not necessarilystrengthened ifdisturbances primarily
originate outside the union and if the domestic country trades primarily
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Althoughthe current period is often characterized as one of flexible
exchange rates, many currencies are tied together in joint floats against
other currencies, forming exchange-rate unions within a system of flexible
rates. This paper investigates how a snail country fares by joining such
an exci-iange—rate union1)
The country is assumed to be buffetted by real and monetary distur-
bances originating at hane and abroad. By joining the union, thiscountry
is able to fix the exchange rate between its currency and the currencies
of the union countries. The central question addressed in thepaper is
whether or not fixing this exchange rate helps to modify the effects of
disturbances on the danestic econany2 The specific sources of the dis—
tubances clearly• matter in determining the inact of the union and so
also does the pattern of trade between hane and foreign countries. The
paper will investigate tv intuitively plausible propositions about these
factorsthat the case for a union is stronger when disturbances primarily
originate outside the union and when the hane country trades primarily with
other countries in the union. The paper shows that neither proposition holds
in general.
(1) The terminology here is potentially confusing. In this study, the term
exchange—rate union refers to an arrangement in which rnanber countries
of the union maintain fixed exchange rates between member currencies,
but with each country retaining its own central bank with control over
its national monetary policy. This limited type of union, which Corden
(1972, p. 3) calls a "pseudo-exchange-rate union", is to be distinguished
from a "canplete exchange rate union", or rronetaty union, with a single
central bank and a union—wide currency.
(2) Tower and Willett (1975) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature
on optimum currency areas which examines the conditions necessary for
successful exchange-rate or monetary unions ; McKinnon (1963) and Mundell
(1961) are t early contributions to this literature. Among other studies
are Allen (1976), Corden (1972), and Ingram (1973). The method of analysis
used in the present study is more similar to that of the internal-external
balance literature, of which Mundell's (1963) study of fixed and flexible rates is the best known.—2—
Themacro model used to address these issues consists of three basic
equations:an aggregate demand equaticdependant upon the tarms of trade
as ll as foreign output, an aggregate supply equation in which latxor supply
is responsive to the general price level, and a financial equation that de-
teniiines the exchange rate of the daistic currency relative to one of the
to foreign currencies (the other being determined by triangular arbitrage).
The paper shows to what extent aggregate supply and demand behavior are
important in detennining the effects of the union. Supply behavior varies
depending upon whether wages respond to prices with a lag or areindexed
to currentchangesin the general price level, while demandbehavioris
particularly sensitive to price elasticities.
The small country model has the advantage of analytic simplicity,
but by itself gives misleading results when foreign disturbances are
examined. The model can be used to show, for example, that variations
in foreign incone due to foreign disturbances anywhere abroad unambi-
guously lead to greater donestic output variance in the union. But without
a model of the two foreign regions, the union countries arid the rest of
the world, it is difficult to determine the total effects of the under-
lying foreign disturbances, since these disturbances affect the daiestic
econany through a variety of channels. For example, in addition to chan-
ging foreign output, a foreign demand disturbance concentrated in one
of the two foreign regions will change the terms of trade between the
foreign goodsiirrtedby the small countryand theexchange rate between
the to foreign currencies.The total effects ofthisforeigndisturbance
thusnay be quite different fran the effects of a change in foreign incane
alone.—3—
Tostudy foreign disturbances, the paper introduces a rrodel of the
twoforeign trading regions with the same analyticalstructure as the small
countrymodel. This model determines the exchange rate and terms of trade
betweenthe two regionsas well as the prices, interest rates, andoutput
ineach region. Foreign disturbances are studied first within this model,
then are traced through the domestic model to determine the effectson
the small country.
The first section of the paper introduces the small country model,
and the next two sections successively examine the effects of disturbances
within the one country and extended models.
I. OUThINEOFTHEM)DE[J
Country 1is a small countrywhichhaseconomicties with two
countriesCountry2 is the potential parther of CountryIin an ex-
change—rate union, while Country3represents the rest of the world.
Country 1 hasfliortant tradeandfinancialties with the other two
countries;the relative importance of these economic ties will be an
issuein the analysis below. Country1 is assumed tobe toosmall to
influenceconditions in either foreign country.3 The two foreign coun-
tries affect Country 1 through their outpits (Y, Y3), the prices of their
goods(P,P), bothexpressedin logarithms,and interestrates (r, r).
In thisthreecountry world, there are three exchange rates to be
determined. If the franc is the currencyofCountry 1, the markthecur-
rency of (buntry 2 andthe dollarthe currencyofCountry 3,thenthe
three exchange rates are as follows (all expressed in logs)
(3) The two foreign countries could represent blocs of countries withfixed
exchange rateswithin each bloc, in whichcase Country 1does not need to be
small relative to individual countries in each bloc. Country 2, for
example, might represent a group of countries in an existingunion
(e.g., the European Monetary System) and Country 3 represent a second
group of countries tied to the dollar.—4—
thefranc price of the dollar,
X. :the mark price of the dollar, and
x2= X- thefranc price of the mark.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among the three currencies.is
exogenously determined for Country 1, while a second exchange rate is•
deteimined by triang-ular arbitrage.
A. Demand Behavior
Unless purchasing power parity is assumed, demand behavior in a
country trading with two other countries is inherently complicated. Three
national pricesareinvolvedas well asat least ts.o exchange rates. We
begin by defining the prices of the three countries' goods expressed in
francs
P price of Country l's good,
+ X priceof Country 3's goodin francs,
+x2:price of Country 2's goodin francs.
It is convenient for later analysis to measure Country2'sprices relative
to Country 3. Define the teims of trade between Countries 2 and3as
Tt=P- (P--X).
Then the price of Country2' s good infrancs can bewritten asP+ Tt+X.
The general price level in Country 1 can be expressed as a weightedaverage
of the prices of the three goods
=
a11P +a12(P + Tt + X) +a13 (P + X), where a1. is the—5—
expenditureweight for country j'Sgood •4)
Thereare two relative prices affecting demand in Country 1, the price
of Country 1' s good relative to each of the foreign goods. The demand for
danesticoutput canbe expressed as a function of these relative prices,
output in the to foreign countries, the real rate of interest, and a
stochastic factor with mean zero and serially uncorrelated'5:
(1) =
g0+g2(P + Tt + X
-P)+ g3(P + 4- P)
2 3 1 1 1,dl (tEIt+i_J+ut
Arise in foreign prices relative to the danestic price is assumed to
increase aggregate demand as is a rise in foreign output6Arise in
thereal interest rate is assumed to reduce aggregate demand. Inthe
caseof perfect substitution between foreign and domestic goods, where
gbeccnes infinite in size, this aggregate demand equation reduces
tothe familiar purchasing power parity relationship.
B. Supply Behavior
When a country imports many of the products it consumes, two pricesare
importantforsply decisions, theprice of dariestic output (Pt) and the ge-
neral price level(I) basedon foreign and dcrnestic prices and foreign ex-
change rates.
(4)When expressed in levels, this price index has a gecmetric form with
weights a11 + a12+a13
=1.
(5)In the appendix this demand function is derived fran a irore standard
dner1 function, and the coefficients, g and g •,areexpressed in
termsof conventional incane ard priceelasticities.
(6) We assume that the Marshall-Lerner condition Ilds, so that the price
coefficients are positive. (See the appendix).
is Countryl'sgeneral price levelatperiodt+1expectedatperiodt,
so (tEIt+i —is the expected change inthatpricelevel.tE+iis as-
sumed to be formed rationally fran the rest of the mcdel.—6—
Outputdecisionsareresponsivetonominal wagesrelative to the price
of domestic output, while wages aresensitiveto the general price level.
Inmany modern economies, moreover, wages are at least partially indexed
to current changesin the general price level. Asa result, supply as
well as demand can respond to current changes in foreign prices and
exchange rates.
The model chosen to represent this supply behavior consists of a
production function of the Cobb-Douglas form and a wage equation based
on the partial or complete indexation of wages.8 The wage equation as-
sumes that labor ties its wage to the general price level in an attempt
to maintain a constant value of purchasing power despite frequent changes
in prices and exchange rates. Because of lags in labor contracts, the cur-
rent wage is based on last period's expectation of current prices. Wages
maybe indexed, however,to protect the wage earner from unexpectedchanges
inthe price level'9
(2a) Y. =(1—c')4+ c
2b
1— E1 1_ 1 W —It
+b(It_1E '•
(8)As with the other structural equatiors in the model, the supply equations
were kept relatively simple. Sincethismodel is used to represent all
three countries(asmodifiedbelow)anyadditionalcomplexities are mul-
tiplied by a factor of three.
(9) For studies of wageindexation behavior,see Fischer (1977), Gray (1976),
Modiglianiand Padoa-Schioppa (1978),and Sachs(1979),the latter two
dealing with openeconomies.Flood and Marion (1980) provide an inte-
resting analysis of how indexation behavior may respondto the choice
of exchange rate regime. Here wehaveassumed thatthe degree ofindexa-
tion hasbeen fixedinstitutionally, leaving optimal indexationbehavior ina union for later analysis.—7—
The coefficient, b, the indexation parameter, typically varies betweenzero
(no indexation) and one (full indexation)
If domestic producers choose an output level where themarginal pro-
duct of labor is equal to their real wage, W. -P.,thenoutput can beex-
pressed as follows
(2) =





Whatever the degree of indexation in theeconomy, output depends upon the
priceof domestic output as well as the general price level. With fullin-
dexation, only currentpricesmatter, but with partial indexation output
responds to unanticipated changes in the general price level through the
differentialimpact of changes in prices onthe real wages faced by pro-
ducersarid rkers, respectively. Notice that when indexation iscomplete
1 1 (b=1), equal increases in Pt andleave supply unaffected. When indexa-
tion is less than ccmplete, however, equal increases inP and I. increase
supply since the real wages faced by producers fall.
C. Financial Behavior
The three countries have t financial assetseachrioneyandbonds
(thelatter bearing interest rate r). To keep the financialsector simple,
hever, the three bonds are assumed to be perfect substitutesso that their
expected returns expressed in the same currency are equal (11)
(10)Note that there are some countries (notably Italy) where indexationhas been greater than 100 %.SeeMdiglianiand Padoa-Schioppa (1978).
(11) For a nre general study of financial behavior inan exchange-rate union, see Marston (1980b).In that studywhere the effectsof various finan-
cial disturbances are analyzed, foreign and domestic bondsare assumed to be imperfect substitutes.—8—
1 3 1 1 r
=r+(tE X1
-X)
2 3 2 2 = rt+(tE X.bfl - Xt).
Thedemandformoney is expressed as a function of domestic prices and
output as well as the interest return,
(3) =
where for convenience the expectedfrancreturn on Country 3'slondreplaces
Country1 's interest rate.
Thebehaviorof the money supply depers upon the exchange rate regime.
Urerflexibleexchange rates, the money supply is assumedtobe exogenously
determined as follows
NM'+ u'.
The current money supply is equal to a base level plus a random term, where
the latter has mean zero and is serially uncorrelated. The supply of money
in the exchange—rate union is described below.
D. Foreign Behavior
AU foreign variables in the model with the exception of X are exo-
genously determined by the small country asstion. We express each foreign
variable as a constant plus a random variable where the latter is the inno-





i —i ri r =r+Ut,i=2,3.
In the third part of the paper, the random variables will be expressed in
(12) terms of the underlying foreign disturbances. Until then, these variables
are assumed to have zero mean, to be serially uncorrelated, and to be Un-
(13) correlatedwith each other.
E. Description of the T Exchange Pate Regimes
Theexchange rate union will be ccmparedwitha regimeofflexible
exchangerates where no exchange market intervention occurs. The flexible
regimeis discussed first.
Flexible Exchange Pates
The basic equations of the model, (1) -(3),determine three dcmestic
variables,Y., P., and X, as functions of all the stochastic and nonsto—
chastic variables .(X.2 is then determined by triangular arbitrage). To fa-
cilitate cararison betwaen the to regimes, equations (1) and (2) are
1 1 1 firstsolved forand Pt as functions of X. and the exogenous variables.
Theresulting expressions, equations (I) and (II) in Table 1, describe
aggregate demand and supply behavior in both exchange-rate regimes 14) The
stochastic variables influencingand P. include the domestic aggregate
demand disturbance, u1, aswellas the random ccaionents of X and the
foreignvariables.
(12)The foreign variables can be expressed in this sirrple form because the
underlying disturbances areassumed to be of mean zero and to be serially
uncorrelated (see Section III).
(13) As a result, tE+l =, andsimilarlyfor the other variables.
(14) Y', P1 andare thereduced form solutions for Y, P1, andwhen
all disturbances are equal to zero. To obtain the coeficients of
in Table 1, we have assumed that the shares of the t foreign goods
in the price indices are proportional to the respective price elastici-
ties in the aggregate demand equation : a12/a13 =g2/g3.This restric-
tion allows trade to be biased toward one foreign country or the other
(see below), but the bias must be equally reflected in thea1 1and10 —
Underflexible rates, the franc price of the dollar, can be
expressed as a function of exogenous variables only by solving all three
equations, (1) —(3),for the reduced form. Equation (lila) in Table 1
presents the expression for X.
Exchange—Rate Union
If Country 1 joins an exchange-rate union with Country 2, the monetary
authorities must intervene in the exchange market to ensure that X2 =4 -
ranainsconstant. For convenience we assume that the franc price of the mark
is initially equal to one (so that the log of this exchange rate, 42, is
initially equal to zero). In that case, intervention keeps 4=atall
times. Suppose that the foreign intervention is carried out by the monetary
authority of Country 1which buys (or sells) Country2's currency and sells
(orbuys) Countryl's currency to keep 42fixed.(The results would be the
(15) sameifCountry 2 carriedoutthisintervention).In that case, equation (3)
describing money market equilibrium simply determines the money supply con-
1 2
sistent withkeeping XequaltoX. In placeof equation (lila)determining




Byjoining the union, Country1has not only fixed its mark exchangerate, but
has effectively surrendered control over its dollar exchange rate.
(15) The choice of which countrytointervene would be importantifthe in-
terventiontook the form ofbuying or selling foreign bonds (as would
bethe case if the foreign currency were used as a reserve currency),
but here we assume a simple form of intervention with no sterilization
ofthe interventioneffects. For ananalysis of different tyoesof in-
tervention policy,seeMarston (1980a).— 11—
II.EW½LUATION OF THEUNION: LOMESTIC DISTURBANCES
Inorder to judge the usefuhiess of the exchange—rate union, we need
toformulate appropriate criteria. A variety of criteria arepossible since
the eonomic effects of the union have many dimensions.In thispaper,we
concentrateour attention on one traditional criterion for judging any change
in policy, the effect of the policy on the variance of domestic output
V =E(Y1 -E(Y'))2 tt
For each disturbance in themodel,weask if introduction of the union in-
creases or decreases the variance of output due to thatdisturbance.Because
ofthe siile stochastic structure described below, moreover, we can deter-
mine the relative sizes of the output variances by ccnaring the increases
or decreasesin output in response to a single (one period)disturbance.
A.Domestic Disturbances
The two disturbances to be analyzed are a money supply disturbance
andanaggregate demanddisturbance.We assume initially thatthereis
no wage indexation in the domestic economy, thenconsiderthe effects of
fullindexation.
Themonetary disturbanceis particularly easy to analyzegiven the
smallcountryassurrption.Thisdisturbancehasnoeffect on output in an
exchange—rate union. A monetaryexpansion,for exarrple, leads to pressure
on1x)th francexchange rates because of the incipient fall indomestic
interestrates, but intervention in the exchange market ensures that
x= x (wherethe latter is exogenously detennined). The disturbance
sirrly results in an equal and offsetting capital flow6 In a flexible
(16) If Country 1 were not small, its dollar exchange rate could change
because the monetary expansion together with theacconanying foreign exchangeintervention would also significantly affect themoney sply in Country 2.— 12—
regime,incontrast, a monetaryexpansion leadsto a depreciation andto
(17) anincrease in output.Thus as in the case where only one foreigTl country
is involved (see Mundell, 1963), donestic monetarydisturbances cause varia-
tionsin output only under flexible exchange rates.
In contrast, an aggregate demand disturbance in Country1leadsto
greater changes in output inan exchange—rateunion. An increase in aggre-
gate demandraises domestic output and prices. There is pressure on }x)th franc
exchangerates because of the incitDient rise in darstic interest rates, but
once again intervention in the exchange market ensures that=X.Under
flexible exchange rates, in contrast, the increase in output leads to an
appreciation of the daaestic currency (X and 42fall)which modifies
the overall increase in aggregate demand (8) Thus there is less output va—
nation under flexible rates.
When wage indexation is complete (b=1),however, these familiar results
breakdown. Aggregate demand disturbances or monetary disturbances then have
identical effects in the to regimes ;thatis, the variance of output is
the same regardless of the exchange rate regime. The reason can be seen by
examining Figure 2 showing how aggregate demand and supply adjust to these
disturbances.
(17) The effect of u on 4inequation (I) can be rewritten for the general
casewereOb 1)
1 —(g2+g+
a11)c(1—b)xl =' + p p — u,wherethe coefficient
of u mustbepositive as long as b is less than one.
(18) Under flexible exchange rates, the direct (positive) impact of u' on
in equation (I) is modified by the fall in u' (which reduces 4).
Outputnonetheless increases even under flexible rates. In contrast,
Mundell'sstudy of internal-external balanceshowed that outputdid
notincrease at all in response to a demand disturbance ;givenhis
assunptions that domestic prices were fixed and exchange rate expec-
tations static, only a constant output was consistent with money mar-
ket equilibrium. In this study, an appreciation of the exchange rate
leads to a change in the expected exchange rate and therefore to a
change in the darstic interest rate, so output can increase despite
a constant noney supply.— 13—
Firstconsider the monetary disturbance. Under flexible rates, the
resulting depreciation leads to an outward shift in the aggregate demand
function (to point B) because of the sensitivity of aggregate demand to
relative prices and the real interest rate. When wages are fully indexed
to the general price level, however, there is a corresponding leftward
shift in aggregate supply (to point C) because the depreciation leads to
rise in the nominal wage. The price of domestic output accordingly rises
further ; in fact, the price of domestic output and the exchange rate in—
crease by the same amount, with the constant terms of trade ensuring that
outputremains fixed at its original ievei.(19) Inthe union, in contrast,
nodepreciation occurs, so the aggregate suly and demand curves remain
atpoint A.With full indexation of wages, therefore, the monetarydistur-
bances leavesoutput unaffected in lx)th regimes. The t regimes differ
with respecttoprice behavior,ho\ever,since prices increase only under
flexiblerates.
Theaggregate demand disturbance does change real output in both
regimes. In the union, the demand disturbances shifts equilibrium to
point A'. Under flexible rates, the increase in demand leads to an appre-
ciation of the franc and to a smaller increase in aggregate demand than
in theunion(topoint B'). With complete indexation of wages, however,
the appreciation of the exchange rate also raises aggegate supply by
lowering real wages faced by producers. Point' is reached where the
(19) Under full indexation, the aggregate supply equation becaTesasimple
function of the termsoftrade, while the aggregate demand equation
isa function of the terms of trade and the real interest rate (as
well as foreign output which is exogenous). Because theexpected change in the exchange rate is equal to the expected change in the
dcxnestic priceas well as in the general price level, there is no
change in the real interest rate. Thereal interest rate could change ifthe disturbances took a more carlicated form, in whichcase there
wouldbe sane changesin output (proportional to g )evenunder full ition. r— 14—
changein output in the same as in the union. Thus, when wages are fully
indexed, the variance of output is the same in either regime.
The case for an exchange—rate union thus depends upon whether dcntestic
rrnetary or demand disturbances are mere important. But with respect to both
types of disturbances, the difference batween regimes diminishes the mere
highly indexed are wages in the econcilly.
III. EV2LUATION OF THE UNION FOREIGN DISTURBANCES
Foreigndisturbances affect the dcxnestic econany through a variety
ofchannels
(a) Changes in foreign output directly affect dcanestic aggregate
demand (proportionally to g2 andg3).
(b) Changes in foreign prices or in the foreign terms of trade induce
substitution with the domestic good(dependingupon the price elasticities,
g2and g3).
(c) In the union,changes in the mark priceof thedollar affect ag-
gregatedemand (throughthosesamepriceelasticities).
(d) Foreign interest rates affect domestic demand indirectly by chan-
gingthe franc price of the dollar underflexible rates and directlythrough
thereal interest rate effect on aggregate demand.
All of these channels are potentially important. For many disturbances, mere-
over, Country l'soutput is pushed in contrarydirections.— 15—
Thenet effect of foreign disturbances on Country 1dependsupon
which of these channels are Itkcst irrortant. That, in turn, depends upon
the types of econanic disturbances encountered as well as on the pattern
of trade. We might expect the union to be nore desirable if economic dis-
turbarices predominantly originate from outside the union and if the pat-
tern of trade is biased so that Country 1 trades primarily with Country 2.
Both ofthese propositions will be explored in the analysis below.
In order to investigate foreign economic disturbances, we needto
specify mDdels of the twoforeign countries. To keep the nodels relatively
sirr?le,weadopt the following assurrptions
1.Countries 2 and 3 have identical economic structures. That is, all the
structural parametersinthe aggregate supply anddemandequations andin
the financial equations are the same for the two countries. Thus we can
specifyone national nodel which can apply to bothcountries.20 This as-
sunptiondoes not restrict the nature of Countryl'srelationships with
the two foreign countries since any asyrrinetries in Country l's links with
the foreign countries could not affect the latter given the small country
assumption. Mcre specifically, Country1maychooseto trade with one country
norethantheother, or nyberrore sensitive to one country'spricesor out-
put.
(20) Thecountries'price indexes, for example, aremirrorimages of one ano-
ther ; the weightofeach country' s own gocx in its price index is the
samefor both countries, a22 =
a33
=a.Note that Countryl's prices
and output are assuned to have a negligible impactonthe foreign coun-
tries ; for example, a21 and a31, the weights of Country l's good in
the foreign price indexes, are assuned to be negligibly snail.— 16—
2.In both foreign countries, there is cariplete wage indexation so that equal
increases indarestic prices andexchange rates(or foreignprices)leave ag-
gregate supply unaffected. Foreign output is then solelya function of the
termsof trade. This assumption considerably simplifies the analysis of the
twoforeign countries making it easier to show the channels through with
foreign disturbances affect Country 1. Even with the simplifying assumption,
theeffects of foreign aggregate demanddisturbancesareambiguous, but we
are ableto distinguish clearly which factors areimportant indetermining
the effects of these disturbances.
Weleave for later analysis cases where foreign countries are asyrrmetric in
econanic structure or size and caseswhere they exhibitsignificantmoney
illusionor lags in adjustment of wages to prices.
A. The Foreign Country Model
Themodel closely parallels thatonespecified for Country1. Diffe-
rences arise primarily because only two countries are involved, given the
small country assumption for Country 1, and because the aggregate supply
equationtakes a simple form when wageindexation is complete. Each na-
tional model can beexpressed in three equations (where i =2,3,ji)















I =aP +(1-a) (P -X).— 17—
Aggregatedemand is a function of the terms of trade, Tt, foreign output,
di and the real interest rate as well as a disturbance term, u .Aggregate
supply is a simple function of the terms of trade. Money demand and supply
in the foreign countries are assind to be identical in form to that of
Country (21)
The two country model is naturally carplex, but its behavior can be
analyzed relatively easily by focusing on two variables, the terms of trade
of Country 2 and the price of Country 3's good.22 The remaining variables
can then be expressed in terms of these two.
The terms of trade of Country 2, defined as Tt =P-(P+ X), can
be expressed as a function of the two aggregate demand disturbances, u2 and
d3 plus a non-stochastic term t d3d2 -(ut-ut) T =T+ - t (N —N")
whereN' =- g-c(i-a)(1 + g+k2g/k1) + g(1-a) <0,
N2 =g+ c(1-a)(1 +gf -k2g1)
+a >o23)
A rise in aggregate demand in Country3lowerstheterms of trade (since
N1 -N2<0),while a rise in aggregate demand in Country2raises the terms
oftrade. With full indexation, monetarydisturbanceshave no effect on the
termsoftrade.
(21) More specifically, we assune thattheinterest andincomeelasticities
ofthe money demand functions are the same as those in Country 1. The
disturbance terms, and u, are assumed to have mean zero and to
be serially uncorrelated.
(22)The price of Country 2 's good, alternatively, could have been singled
out since the model is synirretric with respect to the two countries.
You will recall, however, thatinCountryl'smodel, the foreign prices
weredefinedrelative to Country3'sprice.
(23) The real interest rate effect on aggregate demand is assumed tobe small
enoughso thatN' and N2have the signs indicated.— 18—
Theprice of Country 3's good is a function of the aggregate demand
disturbances as well as the nonetary disturbance in Country 3
r1d22d3 m3
3 k1 LN u -Nu ]u P =P+ -ç -) + t
gL(1+k ) (N'
—N) (1+k r 1 1
A rise in aggregate demand in either country increases the price of Country
3'sgood(aswell as Country 2 's good), while anincrease in Country 3's
ironey supply also raises this price.
Output in either countryisa simple function of the terms of trade
as shown in equation (2)'. Note thatarise in the terms of trade increases
Country2's output (because it reduces the real wage faced by producers) but
decreases Country 3's output. In fact, the increase in Country2 'soutput
isentirely at the expense of Country 3when the two countries areidentical
andeach country's output is a function of the terms of trade alone.
The two remaining foreign variables appearing explicitly in Country l's
model, 4andX, can be expressed in terms of p,Tt, and the rronetary dis-










Ivbnetarydisturbancesnaturally affect both naninalvariables, although an
equal increasein bothnoneysupplies leaves the markpriceof the dollar
unaffectedsincethere arenoasyrrtries betweenthe two econamies.1n
(24)Inderiving the expression for X, we have assumad thattheinterest
rates areinitially 2=— 19—
aggregatedand disturbance affects bothvariablesby changing the terms of
trade and, in the case of the interest rate, by changing Country 3 's price.
B. Foreign Ibnetary Disturbances
Under flexible exchange rates, monetary disturbances abroad have no
iPr prices1
effect on output1n Country 1. With full indexation, a foreign monetary
disturbance only affects naninal variables abroad. A flexible rate can
insulate the home country canpietely from changes in these variables •(25)
This is true regardless of the degree of indexation in Country 1;what
matters is that the foreign countries be fully indexed.26
A general monetary expansion in the two foreign countries, where
u =u
=u,raises the price of Country3's good (or Country 2's good)
by
=-= u/(1+k1),
buthas noeffect on the terms of trade or foreign output as long as the
foreigncountries are fully indexed. The interest rate in Country3 (or
Country2)falls by
r3 3-3 p3 rn3 m u =r-r=(u-u)/k=- ut/(1+k
1
infact,nominal interest rates fall enough to keep real interest rates
abroad constant.
(25) We discuss below,however,anaggregatedemand disturbance which has
effects only on nominalvariables,but for which aflexible rate does
notprovideeffectiveinsulation.
(26)It is interesting to note that the converseisnot true. If Country 1
is fully indexed, but the foreign countries are not fully indexed,
then foreign monetary disturbances have real effects on Country 1.
A general monetary expansion raises output in Country 1 in a flexible
exchange—rate regime as ll as in an exchange-rate union. But with
full indexation in Country 1, the increase in output is identical in
both regimes ; that is, the choice beteen reginEs has no effect on
the variance of output.— 20—
Asfar as Country 1 is concerned, what matters underflexible rates
are the franc prices of the to foreign goods and the francreturn on the
dollar (or mark) security, since theseare the only variables that can af-
fect Country l's aggregate demand orsupply. Both of these remain constant,
however, since the franc price of the dollar (or of themark) falls by
xl 1-1 m3 u =X-X=-u (1+k1),
thereby caletely insulating Country 1 from the disturbance.
Inan exchange-rate union,a monetary disturbance inCountry 3 still
hasno effect on Country 1. Flexibility in thei2arkpriceof the dollar,
whichfalls by
x2 rn3 xl u =- u/(1+k1) =u
sinplyreplacesthe franc price of the dollar as theinsulating factor.
If the monetarydisturbanceis in Country 2, however, then in the
union the fixedexchangerate with thatcountry's currency ensures that
thedisturbance is transmitted to Country1.Consider first the effects
of the monetaryexpansionon the t foreign countries. The price of
Country2's good riseswhile its interest rate falls
=u/(1+k1)
=- u2.
Themark priceof the dollarrises enoughto insulateCountry 3fromthedis-
turbance : u =u/
(1 +k1)
;asa result1 Country 3price andinterest
rate remainfixed.
Intermsofthe franc, Country1 'scurrency,the pricesof both foreign
goodsrise in the unionthefranc price of Country2' s good rises because
its mark price rises, and the franc price of Country 's good rises because
of the depreciation of the mark (and hence the franc) relative to the dollar.— 21—






Thus,if there is a union betweenCountries1 and2, nonetary disturbances
originatingin Country 2 are transmitted toCountry1.
C.gregate Demand Disturbances
Demand disturbances generally do affectCountry 1 under }x)th flexible
exchange rates or the union. How a country fares in theto regimes depends
upon the specific form which the disturbance takes. Wewill consider three
types of demand disturbancesbecause they all provide insight into theef-
fects of the union
(1)A shift indemandfrom the prcxucts of Country 3 to thoseof
Country 2. The shift in demand affectsCountry 1 primarily by changing
the terms of trade and shiftingoutput (and hence demand for Coun l's
prcxlucts) from one foreign country to another. Thisdisturbance serves
to illustrate the irrprtance of thepattern of trade between Country 1
and the other countries.
(2) A generalized increase in demand inloth countries.This disturbance,
in contrast, si-ows why pricesensitivity in Country 1 is ijtortant, since
aggregate demand disturbances originating abroad havedifferent effects
on the franc exchange rate dependingupon Country 1 's price elasticities.
(3) An increase in demand which isconcentrated in one country more than
the other, a third case combining thefirst t to show the irtportance
of where the disturbance occurs.
(27) Country l's interest rate falls because with a fixed ratebetween the
1 2 francand mark, rmustdeclinewith r. Onlyif there is full wage
indexation in Country 1 (b=1) does this purely nominaldisturbance
leave Country 1 's output unaffected in the union. Theflexibility ofwages and prices then makes up for the fixity of the exchange rate.— 22—
Allof these disturbances have the effect of changing interestrates
abroad. If the real interest rate effect on aggregate demand in Country 1 is
large enough, ho\ever, even a generalized demand expansion abroad will have
aiubiguous effects on Country l'soutputsince the resulting rise in foreign
interest rates runs counter to other effects on the foreign demand expansion.
To avoid this additional ambiguity, v assume in this section that the real
interest rate effect in Country 1 is zero (g =0).Under this assumption,
higher foreign interest rates can still have a significant effect on Country
l's output, but indirectly by changing exchange rates.
Equation (I) can then be written in the following simplified fonn
c(1—ba
(I) =1+ [u1 + + g3u]
g c(1—b) g c(l—b)
+p3 -
(u3+ u) + z (u3+ u + u1),
xixl where u =u,flexiblerates,
=u2,exchange—rate union,
Z =g2+g3+c(1-ba11).
Note that any aggregate demand disturbance originating aboard affects Country l's
output either through changes in foreign output or changes in the (franc) prices
of foreign gcods.
1. Shift in Demarx
Suppose that there is a shift in demand to Country 2 'sproducts from those
of Country 3 with
d2 d3 Ut =St, Ut
=— st, St> 0.— 23-




Output rises in Country 2 and falls inCountry 3proportionatelyto the change
inthe terms of trade. Interest rates rise in Country 2 but fall in Country 3
as a result, the mark appreciates by
x2—[2k2J(1—a)+ iiT U = U<0.
(1 +k1)
Sincethe two foreign econciiuies are identical, this shift disturbance rroves
each econcniy in equal but oppositedirections.
With the two foreign countries responding symaetricafly to the distur-
bance, the effect on Country 1 clearly depends upon its pattern of trade with
the two countries. First, consider the neutral case where Country 1' s trade
is evenly balanced betven Country 2 and Country 3, so that the output and
price coefficients (or elasticities) in equation (I)' are equal,g2 y3
g2
=g(28)In this case, theshift in demandhasno effect on Countryl's
outputunder flexible rates. The foreign output term in equation (I)' is zero
sinceu2 =- u3,so theshiftin demand has no direct output effect on Coun-
try 1 's aggregate demand.In addition, it can be shown that thefranc prices
of goodsfran thetwo countries moveinequaland oppositedirections as
follows
p3 xl T Country 3 s good:ut +Ut =-
p3 xl T T
Country2 s good u+u + Ut =ut/2.
Thischange in relative prices also has opposing effects on aggregate demand.
So Country 1' s output is insulated frai' the disturbance.
(28) Country 1 's trade is evenly balanced in the sense that its exports (and
inorts) to the foreign countries are equal. The incane coefficients also
depend upon the incane elasticities of demand forCountryl'sgoodin the
two foreign countries, while the price coefficients also depend upon the
export and inort price elasticities. (See the Jppendix). We assume these
are equal for the two countries throughout the discussion in this section,
although the trade pattern could alternatively be interpreted in terms of
asyrrinetries in these underlying elasticities.— 24—
Underflexible rates,the franc appreciates relative to the dollar, but
byless than the markappreciatessince the franc depreciates relative to the
mark.(Recall that the shift in demand towards Country 2 's products raises
Country 2 's interest rate and lowers Country 3's interest rate). In fact,
the appreciation of the franc is exactly half as large as that of the mark
xl [2 k2c(1 —a)+ ]Tx2 u =- ut=ut/2. 2(1 + k1)
In the union, the franc is tied to the mark,so itappreciates more than under
flexiblerates(i.e., twiceas much). Thefranc prices of lxthforeign goods
fall, so output in Country 1 mustfallinthe union, andCountry 1 is accor-
dingly worse off.
For similar reasons, Country 1 fares better under flexible rates when
trade is biased towards Country 3(g,3 >g2,g3 >g2). In that case, the
directeffect of the shift in foreign output is to reduce Countryl's aggre-
gate demand since the output of its closest trading parther, Country 3, drops.
Since the appreciation of the franc in the union is greater than under flexible
rates, Country 1' s output falls even further in the union than under flexible
rates. The greater appreciationassociated withthe union adds to the defla-
tionary effects of the shift in demand. (29)
(29) This result holds even if there is no foreign output effect (ie, the
output coefficients are equal, g2g3), since the price effects of
the disturbance arealso greater inthe union than in the flexible re-





thisexpression must be negative. Inthe union, the franc
•appreciates even more than under flexible rates, thereby adding to the
deflationary price effects of the shift in demand.— 25—
IfCountry l's trade is biased towards Country 2 (g2 <g3, g2< g3),
which may be the more likely case for a country joininga union,then the
direct output effect is positive. That is, the shift in output towards Country
2 tends to raise Country l's output. Now the greater appreciation of the franc
in the union than under flexible rateshelp to stabilize Country l's out-
put.30 So the union may be superior to flexible rates when trade is biased
towards Country 2. If the price elasticities (g 's) are large enough so that
the price effects in equation (I') daninate the output effect, however, then
once again the greater appreciation of the franc in the union becomes a draw-
back. Country 1 's output then varies more in the union than under flexible
(31) rates.
2. General Increase in Demand
There is no longer the same presurrtion in favor of flexiblerates when
thedemand disturbance is a general one,
d2 d3d
Ut =Ut =Ut.
(30) In the union, equation (I)' can be written
= +c(1 -
ba11)(y2 —gy3)c(i-a) U/Z —g3c(1-b)u/Z
—
(g2+ g3) c(1—b) [k2 J(i-a) —k1/2]u/Z(1+k1).
The outputeffect is positive ifg 2 > g 31 while theprice effects are
y y
negative(assuming that k2 c (1-a) > k1/2)because of the appreciation
ofthe franc. Since the price effects run counter to the output effect,
one mayneutralizethe other thus helping to stabilize Country1' sout-
put.
(31) In equation(I'), theprice terms increase in (absolute) value relative
to the foreign output termasthe price elasticities (g2, g3) increase.— 26—
Flexiblerates are superior to the union only when price elasticities are high.
If demand increases (or decreases) by the same auunt in both countries,
there is no change in the terms of trade nor in the mark price of the dollar.
Since foreign output is a function of the real wage, which is constant as long
• • (32) as the terms of trade remain fixed, output in both countries is constant.
So this demand disturbance has effects only on nominal quantities. DiTstic




Similarly,both rates of interest rise
r3 p3 r2 u=ut/ki=ut.
Inthe exchange—rate union,thereis no change in thefrancprice of the
dollarsince the mark price of the dollar is fixed. But the rise in foreign
prices increases output in Country 1 with the increase proportional to the
price elasticities, g2 + g3. (See equation (I')).
Underflexible rates as well, Countryl's output is increased. Whether
outputis increased rrore or less under flexible rates depends upon whether
the franc appreciates or depreciates. There are tw influences on the ex—
change rate : higher foreign interest rates lead to depreciation of the
franc, while higher danestic interest rate due to the increase in dcwnestic
transactions lead to an appreciation. How much the domestic interest rate
increases depends upon the price elasticities,g2
and g3, since higher
price elasticities imply greater increases in darestic output. The franc
appreciatesif the product of these price elasticities and the income
(32) If indexation were less thancompletein the foreign countries, this
typeof demand disturbance would lead to increases in output as well
as prices, with the relative importance of changes in output increasing
as the degreeofindexation fell.— 27—






If the franc appreciates, thendarresticoutput increases less under flexible
ratesthan in the union. A depreciation, on the other hand, causes domestic
output to increase irore under flexible rates. Thus in the presence of this
general demand disturbance, the union increases or decreases the variance
of output depending upon whetherk2 (g2 +g3)is greater or less than
(34) one.
3. Increase in Demand Concentrated 'bre in One Country
Shifts in demand between the two foreign countries and general increases
in demand abroad have very different effects on Country 1, but in each case
the cloice between flexible rates and the union is relatively siniple. Unfor-
tunately, actual demand disturbances that occur seldom fall solely in one
xl. (33) In the union (whenu is constant), the foreign interest rate rises
by u3 =u3/k1,whereas the domestic interestrate rises by
u1+ku'1 u3 =
k
2 t=[i+c(1-b)(k2 g2 +k2g3 -l)/Z]
If k2(g2 +g3)
>1,then the danesticinterestrate rises rrorethan
theforeign interest rate ;thusunder flexible rates, the franc appre-
ciates relative to the dollarand mark. Butif k2 (g2+g3) <1,the
francdepreciates. p p
(3L1)Ananalogous condition uld apply to a small countrychcosingbetween
fixedand flexibleexchange rates (i.e., where only one foreigncountry is involved). The abeve condition resembles the Marshall-Lerner— 28—
category,but more often takethe formof expansions or contractions of
aggregate demand that are highly correlated across cOuntries but are con-
centrated more in one foreign country or the other. Such demand disturban-
ces can either strengthen or aken the case for an exchange—rate union
depending upon which countryexperiencesthe greater change in demand.
The analysis of thismoregeneral case, however,candraw on the first
t cases, since this disturbance can be regarded as a canbination of the
first t'o. Suppose that both countries experience a demandexpansion,but







d3d - = u(+)
whereeach disturbance includes a carron element (u) medifiedby the shift
(35) term
Thegeneral increase in deirand (represented by the u factor) raises
outputin Country 1under bothexchangerate regimes. Under which regime
outputexpands more depends again on the price elasticities. Suppose that
k2p2 + g3) =1,so thatthegeneral, increase in demand hasthesame
effect on outputin the union as under flexible rates. Then the choice
between regimes depends upon which country ismore subjectto the demand
disturbance.
(34) condition, which requires that the sum of the elasticities of export
and import demand exceed 1.Theseelasticities, however, are those of the
aggregate demand functionas a whole; in fact, as the Zppendix shows,
the Marshall-Lerner condition is required in order for these elasticities
tobe positive.When indexation iless than complete in the t foreign
countries,the effect of foreign demand disturbances depends not only
upon these price elasticities but also upon the relative degreeofin-
dexation in the daresticandforeigncountries.
(35)We assume that s is proportional to d,=d, where sis a
fractionless than one so that u. =(1-s)u. > 0. t t— 29—
Considerthe case where trade is balanced between Country 1 and the
twD foreign countries (the neutral case considered in Section 1), but where
the increase in demand is more concentrated inCountry 2. Then strangely
enough Country 1 is better off in the exchange-rate union --tyingitself
to the country with greater demand disturbances. That issimply because
changes in relative prices counter the effects of the general expansion.36
With the disturbance more concentrated in Country 2, the terms oftrade of
thatcountry riseandthemarkappreciates.Under flexible rates, the franc
alsoappreciates relative to the dollar, but by less that the mark.By
joining the union, Country 1 ties the franc to the mark and finds itsoutput
increasing less because of the dampening effect of the mark'sappreciation.
If Country l's trade is biased toward Country2, however, thenthe
advantage ofa union over flexible rates is diminished. Thisparadoxical
result arises because the pattern of trade helps to determine howmuch
thefranc appreciates relative to the dollar under flexiblerates. The
franc appreciates more under flexible rates when trade is biasedtoward
the country with the greater expansionofoutput than when trade is ba-
lanced, since Country 1' s interest rate rises more in the formercase. So
the advantage of moving to a union, where the franc is tiedto the appre-
ciation mark, is correspondingly diminished.
When trade is balanced but the increase in demand ismore concentrated
in Country 3, in ,Country1 is worse off in the union. Now the mark
depreciates more than the franc. So joining the union further increases the
effect of the disturbance on Country 1 's output.
(36) We assume, however, that the demand shift is notlarge enough to lower Country l's output in either regime.— 30—
Thusthe net impact of this more general disturbance depends not only
on price elasticities, but on thelocationof the disturbance, withoutput
variation beingsmallerin the union whenthedisturbance is concentrated
in the union country. nd the pattern of trade is also important, but greater
trade with the union country can actually weaken the case for a union. This
disturbance serves particularly well to illustrate the pitfalls in easy ge-
neralizations about how the source of econcmic disturbances or the pattern
of trade affect the case for a union.
o0o
The form which a foreign demand disturbance takes clearly determines
how desirable an exchange rate union would be. Only in the case of a demand
shift between countries is there a definite presumption in favor of one re-
gime or the other, but that presumption is in favor of flexible rates. In
the second case, that of a general increase in demand, the union is superior
only if priceselasticities arelow. In the final case, where the disturbance
is concentratedmore inonecountrythan theother, the resultalso depends
upon where the disturbance is concentrated as well as upon the pattern of
trade. If foreign demand disturbances are a major source of concern, the
case for or against an exchange—rateunion will have tobe based on a va-
riety of considerations including the type of disturbance typically en-
countered, the pattern of trade with union and non—union countries, and the
price sensitivity of the darstic economy.— 31—
IV.CONCLUSION
This paper has shown how a union uld affect a country subject to rrone—
tary and aggregate demand disturbances originating at home or abroad. How much
difference a union makes depends first of all on domesticwage behavior. Iny
disturbance has an identical effect on the home country under flexible rates
or in an exchange-rate union if wages are fully indexed to the general price
level. Short of full indexation, the case for a union is stronger ifrirnetary
disturbances originate at home rather than abroad and weaker if domestic de-
mand disturbances are important. But the advantage of one regime over another
diminishes the closer is the country to full indexation.
Zpart from wage behavior, t other factors are important : the pattern
of trade and the sources of disturbances. But a pattern of trade biased toward
the potential parther in the union does not always beister thecase for a union.
Such a pattern of trade will not rrdify in anywaythe effect of domestic dis-
turbarices as long as Country 1 is small.Inthe case of saneforeigndemand
disturbances, rrcreover, trade weighted toward the unioncountryactually re-
duces the advantages of a union. The sources of econan.ic disturbances also
playa caiplex role in the choice of regimes. With respect to foreign mone-
taxy disturbances, the case for a union is weaker, as might have been expected,
when the monetary disturbance is concentrated in the unioncountry.But with
respectto foreign dnanddisturbances,the case for a union is actually
strengthened when the demand disturbance is larger in the union country. The
effectsofa union are indeed complex, with easygeneralizations tenuous at
best.— 32—
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APPENIJIX:THE AGGREGATE DEMAND FUNCT ION
The foreign output and price coefficients in the aggregate demand
equation play a major role in the analysis of foreign disturbances. This
appendix derives the aggregate demand equation from a more traditional
equation (in level form) and interprets the output and price coefficients
interms of this more traditional model.
We begin with an expression relating output to consumption,
exports, and imports:
(Al) Q1= c1()+EX2(Q2,R)+EX3(3,R)-R2(Q1,R) -IM(Q1,R)
All variables are expressed in level form with the time subscripts omitted.
and C'are domestic output and spending in Country i,respectively,
while EX' is the demand for exports of Country 1 by Country i and IM' is
the demand for imports from Country i by Country 1. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that there are no changes in the terms of trade
between the two foreign countries and that the dollar prices of the two
foreign goods are initially equal. Thus R can represent the terms of
trade between Country 1 and either foreign country. We also assume that
trade is initially balanced with each foreign country so that EX' =RIM'.
Define the following elasticities (where the partial derivative
with respect to the first (second) argument of a function has the subscript
1 (2)):
h. =incomeelasticity of foreign demand for Country l's good,
=EX(Qi/EXi)
fi =priceelasticity of foreign desand for Country l's good,
=EX(R /Ex'),
=priceelasticity of domestic demand for Country i's good,
=-IM(R/INi).— 34—
Also,define d =sumof the marginal propensities to save and to import
by Country 1(1 -c) + IM
+IM.
Then equation (Al) can be written
in terms of percentage changes as follows:







Thusthe coefficients of the aggregate demand equation in the text,
which is expressed in logarithms, can be written:
g. h. ()/ d,
g. =(nf.+n.-i)()/ d.
The relative sizes of the g. coefficients depend •upon the income elasticities
in the twoforeign countries (h1) aswell as the share of exports to
countryiasa fraction of total domestic output. The relative sizesof
the g. coefficients depend upon the underlying price elasticities as
well as the share of exports. The Marshall-Lerner condition for the trade
balance between Country 1andCountry i is
nf. +n.-1>1,
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